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MALL ISLANDS, BIG ISSUES 
The first Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS) convened in Barbados in 1994. The purpose of 
the gathering was to examine national and international strategies, and adopt 
plans and programmes intended to enable these territories and their limited 
resources to undergo development in a sustainable manner, while enhancing 
in them the coping mechanisms and human skills necessary to pursue 
sustainable development. 
The Barbados Conference was a spinoff from the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development - known as the Earth 
Summit - which met in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The purpose of the 
Summit was to debate a challenging list of pressing environmental issues 
known as Agenda 21, and follow this up with the implementation of an 
action plan. 
That the numerous small, mainly island, states could engineer this 
much international support for their own perspective on environmental 
concerns, and provoke a full-scale international conference, is due to three 
main factors. First is the powerful lobbying efforts that these three dozen 
or so member states have exercised via the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS), gaining a platform and a hearing. Second is the contention that, 
because of geography, size and ecology, environmental problems are 
bound to impinge on sm~ll island territories in special ways. That these 
two explanations carry any weight at all is, however, debatable given the 
third reason, that islands remain important geo-strategic platforms and 
sovereign custodians of large tracts of marine resources: they would 
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therefore merit being appeased and sponsored in their own mini world 
summit. 
The caption of the publicity poster for Barbados 1994 could not have 
been more striking. The physical limitations and insularity of the world's 
smallest states and territories contribute to an intensification of the 
problems associated with environmental management and economic 
development: small islands, big issues. 
Small and Island (often Nation, but almost always semi-autonomous) 
States are, faithful to their acronym, promising candidates for proving to 
be the SINS of the world. Still considered by some as quirks of de colon i-
zation, we continue today to come across arguments expounding their 
non-viability, while they continue to survive. Environmental issues are 
among the latest in a long series of hazards that are alleged to threaten not 
just the quality of life of small island citizens but their very physical 
existence. 
Islanders have heard it all before. Their condition is one of extreme 
proneness to a wide repertoire of external interventions. Economically, 
small island territories suffer from dependence on a very narrow range of 
products (sugar, bananas, copra, pineapple, cod, marijuana?), light manu-
facturing (textiles, screwdriver industries, data processing) or services 
(tourism, tax havens, banking), with hardly any influence on the terms of 
trade. The weakness of the arrangement is that it is wide open to potentially 
erratic market fluctuations, which these territories cannot control or even 
predict. Financially, micro-insular territories receive considerable largesse 
from beyond their shores. These include remittances from emigrants as 
well as official public transfers and other forms of bilateral or multilateral 
aid. Such inflows constitute a regular and necessary supplement to the 
balance of payments that would otherwise never balance high expenditures 
with low, locally generated revenues. Ecologically, small islands are prone 
to natural disasters - cyclones, epidemics, droughts. While larger 
countries can often take such mishaps in their stride, these small places are 
likely to suffer shattering and long-lasting consequences. 
Of course, vulnerability is not necessarily an intrinsically negative 
attribute. Proclaiming peculiar fragility and weakness may make ample 
diplomatic sense, if it attracts lucrative conference tourism, or begets 
international attention and financial or commercial assistance. 
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Nevertheless, small islands stand out as quasi -laboratory test cases that 
allow an examination of the effects of industrialization or a change to 
services, as well as the policy outcomes concerning the tension of 
economic development and environmental preservation. Such countries 
could thus serve as advance (and, being small and remote, affordable) 
warnings of undesirable scenarios. Already the archipelagic reef of Tuvalu 
is an un-willing prime target for the possible effects of global warming. It 
will disappear silently beneath the waves of the South Pacific owing to sea 
level rise, unless the causes behind global warming are halted and, 
preferably, swiftly reversed (Lewis, 1990). 
The silence of such disappearance bears testimony to the benign neglect 
with which small islands have been treated. The approval and implemen-
tation of the Declaration and Programme of Action of the Barbados Con-
ference - dealing with the management of environmental problems, the 
sound harnessing of natural resources, and human resource development 
needs - might go a little way towards preventing this outcome (Streeten, 
1993). 
But the issue of sustainable development is complex and multifaceted. 
While an attractive catch phrase, its actual application may prove elusive. 
Its implementation looms much larger than the capacity of any single 
nation, let alone any small island territory. One of the fundamental 
concerns is precisely to avoid a consideration of the issue of sustainability 
from an exclusively national perspective. Such would be a case of intellectual 
paralysis, resulting in very serious policy lacunae. 
This paper deals with the various, at times conflicting, interpretations 
of sustainable development and of the problems of implementation. It 
proposes various alternative scenarios bearing a sensitivity to global, regional, 
or local environmental degradation. The paper concludes with a plea for 
a global environment protection agency, one that would correct the 
current lag of institutional infrastructural provision behind technological 
enhancement. Such an agency would also avoid those subtle social traps 
that would otherwise prevent the activation of cooperation at the global 
level towards a more efficient and equitable allocation of resources. 
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DEFINITION 
Sustainable development, in the words of the report of Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, chair of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (WCED), is "development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs" (WCED, 1987).1 This definition is sufficiently vague to 
cover many contingencies. J. R. Hicks similarly wrote that "the purpose of 
income calculation in practical affairs is to give people an indication of the 
amount which they can consume without impoverishing themselves" 
(Hicks, 1946: 172). Even this definition is elusive, because the maximum 
amount of consumption that individuals can expect to maintain while 
keeping the initial level of wealth intact depends on their expectations of 
future prices and interest rates. But current values, according to economic 
doctrine, reflect the best estimates that economic agents can make of this 
uncertain future. 
A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL ISSUE 
Sustainable development has come to mean much more than maintaining 
intact the physical capital that produces an income stream (or increasing 
it in line with population growth, technological developments, intertemporal 
preferences, ete.). Maintenance, replacement, and growth of capital assets, 
both physical and human, is certainly one aspect of sustainability. Physical 
wear and tear, technical obsolescence, and the depreciation of human 
capital have to be taken into account. 
Secondly, not only physical but also human capital has to be 
maintained. Technical, managerial, and administrative knowledge and its 
dissemination through education can be substitutes for physical and 
1 Another definition in the same report is "a process of change in which 
the exploitation of resources, direction of investments, orientation of 
technological development, and institutional change are all in harmony 
and enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs 
and aspirations" (p. 46). 
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environmental capital, or they can be complementary to it. In the ability 
ofhwnan inventiveness to substitute for exhaustible resources lies the hope 
for sustainability. 
A third aspect, to which much attention has been paid recently, is 
maintaining the physical and environmental conditions for the constituents 
of well-being. Unless the environmental resources serving as inputs are 
valued in themselves (as some of them certainly are), it is the results, not 
the means, that must be sustained. This implies two distinct things: first, 
avoiding polluting the water, air, and land on which our lives and work 
depend; and, second, avoiding the exhaustion of renewable resources that 
are essential for production, unless adequate replacement is provided.2 (It 
may imply increasing these environmental resources, again depending on 
population growth, technology, preferences, ete.) As to non-renewable 
resources, the implication is that investment in substitutes should take 
place, so that the productive base for sustaining well-being is maintained. 
Related to this is a fourth aspect of sustainability: resilience. The 
system must be able to adjust to shocks and crises, to be sufficiently flexible 
and diverse with respect to resources (including biological diversity) and 
practices (including approaches to knowledge), to maintain itself in the 
face of an uncertain future. 
A fifth aspect is avoiding burdening future generations with internal 
and external debts. Although to anybody burdened with a debt liability 
there corresponds an equivalent asset holder, this does not mean that the 
net debt burden is zero. Tax liabilities, and the ability to enjoy interest 
receipts, have important effects on incentives to work, save, and risk, in 
addition to the distributional impact. 
A sixth aspect of sustainable development is fiscal, administrative, and 
political sustainability. A policy must be credible and acceptable to the 
citizens, so that there is sufficient consent to carry it out. Fear of popular 
protest in the form of mass demonstrations or riots can frustrate reforms. 
In order to be sustainable politically, the course of opposition and 
resistance has to be traced and measures to overcome it have to be 
2 Accounting for the depletion of exhaustible natural resources is easier 
than for environmental values such as clean air and water, for the former 
have market prices, a useful starting point, which the latter do not. 
, 
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designed. The administrative apparatus must be capable of carrying it out 
on a continuing basis, and revenue must be available to meet the needs of 
public expenditure. International peace and domestic security are important 
dimensions of political sustainability. 
A seventh aspect is the ability to hand over the management of projects 
to citizens of the developing country in which they are located, so that 
foreign experts can withdraw without jeopardizing their success. This 
implies training local counterparts and helping to create local techno-
logical, managerial, and administrative capacity. 
Sustainability is therefore a multi-dimensional problem. It implies res-
ponsible behaviour towards future generations, despite the fact that they 
have no vote and cannot put direct pressures on policy-makers. 
"Sustainability" by itself is, however, not a clearly defined term. First, 
there is the problem, already mentioned, whether one should be concerned 
with sustaining the constituents of well-being or its determinants, whether 
with the means or the ends. Clearly, what ought to matter are the 
constituents, the health, welfare, and prosperity of the people, and not so 
many tons of minerals, so many trees, or so many animal species. Yet, 
some of the writings on the subject confuse the two. 3 If in the process of 
curing ovarian and other forms of cancer the Pacific yew trees (or even the 
Northern spotted owl, to whom the forests are home) had to be reduced 
in number, in order to produce the drug taxol, people's health must be 
given priority over trees.4 Of course, some would want to attach 
end-values to many of the determinants, insofar as they are part of "nature" 
3We have been, so far, remarkably successful in inventing substitutes 
for, or in economizing in, exhaustible resources. The exhaustion of a 
natural resource cannot leave us worse off than we were before its 
discovery. Wilfred Beckerman once pointed out that the world had 
survived remarkably well without Beckermonium, a mineral named 
after an ancestor of his who failed to discover it in the 19th century. 
~ axol has been produced from the bark of the Pacific yew tree, which 
is now endangered. University of Kansas researchers now claim that a 
Himalayan relative of the Pacific yew tree could serve as an alternative 
source of taxo!. From this tree, Taxus baccata, unlike the yew tree, taxol 
can be extracted from its needles and twigs, without hurting the tree. 
See Wall Street Journal, Monday, April 20, 1992, B6. 
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(such as the Grand Canyon). This view might be called ethical environ-
mentalism in contrast to prudential environmentalism. 
Then there is the question as to sustainability at what level, or at what 
rate of growth or decline? There is nothing sacrosanct about the existing 
stock of resources. Population in Western Europe is stationary or may 
decline, but Kenya's population will be three times today's in 2025, and 
world population will be more than 8 billion people, compared with over 
5 billion today. Sustaining income per head for humankind may imply 
increasing the stock of resources. On the other hand, substitution possibil-
ities and technical innovation imply the ability to run some down. 
Population growth, technological innovations, and intertemporal preferences 
will determine whether the stock should be increased, kept constant or 
reduced, and at what rates, or whether its composition should be changed. 
But, as The Economist has put it, "sustainable development is still useful. 
Like many important ideas, it is better than nothing for as long as there is 
nothing better" (The Economist, Sept. 16, 1989: 77). 
THREATSTOTHEE~RONMENTOF 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The principal threats to the physical environment of the developing 
countries can be grouped under the following headings: 
1) Continuing rapid rates of population growth; 
2) Accelerating rates of urbanization with consequential air and 
water pollution; 
3) Atomic energy: accidents, waste disposal, sabotage; 
4) Damage done by persistent pesticides and other dangers to the 
food chain; 
5) Damage done by industrial trace materials and toxic waste disposal; 
6) Destruction of forests and soils, plant and animal life; 
7) Depletion of fisheries; 
8) Silting and salination; 
9) Air and water pollution and the depletion of fisheries; and 
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10) Global and regional transnational concerns about warming, the 
orone layer, acid rain, and ocean pollution. 
It will be seen that this list overlaps with, but is not identical to, a similar 
list that could be drawn up for advanced industrial countries. Whereas 
poverty is the main cause of environmental degradation in poor countries, 
it is opulence in the rich countries. (This is not true of all forms of 
environmental degradation. Urban air and water quality have shown a 
tendency to improve above a certain income level.) Poverty and population 
pressure generally drive people to the cultivation of ever more marginal 
land. This erodes the soil and depletes shallow water resources, causing 
growing poverty as crop yields fall and women spend more time collecting 
firewood and fetching water. It is estimated that 14 million people in the 
developing countries have become environmental refugees, driven from 
their homes by environmental degradation. The poor are both the cause 
and the victims of environmental degradation. 
The rapid rates of population growth are the consequence of the 
introduction of modern death rates, resulting from modern death control, 
into societies with little cheap and effective birth control, and hence with 
traditional birth rates. At low income levels, children are wanted because 
firewood and water have to be collected and many household chores have 
to be done. Old people need sons to look after them. Even young parents 
need many helpers. There is a vicious circle between the desire for large 
families, which leads to environmental damage, and the need for more 
hands to overcome the damage. 
The so-called demographic transition from one equilibrium, in which 
both death rates and birth rates are high, to another, in which both are 
low, is both difficult and slow. The implications of this demographic 
transition have been discussed at length, and all that is needed here is to 
note that it involves heavy environmental pressures in the poorest societies. 
Population growth in the developing countries is about five times as great 
as it is in the advanced countries in the second half of this century. The 
world's population has doubled since 1950 and will be well in excess ofl0 
billion in 2050. It may be as large as 20 billion. The share of people living 
in the advanced countries has fallen from 35 per cent in 1950 to about 20 
per cent today, and continues to fall. The 80 per cent in the developing 
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countries account for less than 20 per cent of the world's conswnption. If 
present trends continue, world population will not stabilize until a size of 
10 or 11 billion is reached. About 40 per cent of the population in the 
developing countries is less than fifteen years old, compared with 30 per 
cent in the developed countries. The high dependency ratio implied by 
such an age distribution puts a heavy burden on the working population, 
on social services such as education, on the government budget, and on the 
ability to mobilize resources for development. 
It is anticipated that, between now and the year 2000, one billion 
people will be added to the populations of cities, more than the total 
nwnber in cities now. The fastest growing cities are in the developing 
countries, where the ability to cope with the strains of urbanization is 
weakest. Here again, the literature is large and it must suffice to mention 
the high costs of urban services and the threats to the environment from 
pollution of air and water, congestion, noise, and disease transmission. 
The dangers from atomic energy, on which many developing 
countries are embarking, stem from the threat of the proliferation of 
nuclear weapon capability, reactor failures, the difficulties of disposing of 
radioactive waste, the possibility of diverting plutoniwn by terrorist 
groups, and the uncertainty about radiological standards. Less widely 
discussed but perhaps at least equally serious is the potential threat to civil 
liberties that arises from the need to protect societies against terrorists and 
saboteurs. The need for armed guards and possibly private armies to guard 
nuclear power stations can bode ill for hwnan freedom. While all these 
problems exist also in advanced countries, the level of technical 
competence of dealing with them is lower in developing countries. Some 
of these dangers have implications that reach beyond national boundaries. 
They call for international coordination or transnational, global institutions, 
to be discussed more fully below. 
The attraction of using cheap and effective chemical pesticides in 
agriculture is clear in countries where the pressure to grow more food is 
very strong, but the long-term adverse effects can be immense. 
The urgent advances of industrialization will tend to spread trace 
materials of industrial origin: mercury, cadmiwn, polychlorinated 
biphenyls, and other substances can have poisoning effects on people. 
Paper that is chlorine-bleached contains dioxin and other organochlorines, 
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which, in sufficiently large doses, are hazardous substances. Lavatory paper, 
tampons, Kleenex, milk cartons, coffee filters, and disposal diapers contain 
it. 5 Firms from advanced countries have used developing countries as the 
dumping ground for their toxic waste. 
The destruction of tropical forests as a result of the need for fuel (or 
for foreign exchange from the export of wood), with the associated adverse 
effects on soils, is now well-documented, though the effects on climate and 
the global atmosphere, and on the alleged mass extinctions of plant and 
animal species, are more controversial. Dams have caused silting, and 
irrigation canals have led to salination, destroying the fertility of the land. 
A concern for environmental protection for developing countries is 
often met with hostility. It is felt that the industrialized countries have 
achieved high levels of living and now wish to prevent or slow down the 
same process of industrialization in tl1e developing countries, for the sake 
of preserving values and interests that are mainly the concern of the rich. 
Sceptics of environmental protection can also say that preserving the 
environment has many of the ingredients beloved of women's magazines 
- animals, a strong medical interest, and a readily identifiable villain. It is 
a cause that appears to appeal to the most advanced sociologists and to 
those who detest change in any form, to old people of both sexes and to 
the revolting young of unidentifiable sex, to the silent majority and the 
screaming minority, to the young swingers and to the old danglers. The 
majority of respondents in a recent Louis Harris poll in the USA rated a 
clean environment more important than a satisfactory sex life (Atlantic 
Monthly, October 1990). No wonder, then, that some spokespersons for 
the developing countries have said to those from the developed countries: 
"you have enriched yourselves by rapacious exhaustion of scarce raw 
materials and polluting the environment, and now you want to stop the 
5Recently there has been a reassessment of dioxin. In 1992, an 
independent panel of scientists concluded that dioxin was not a 
large-scale cancer threat, except to people exposed to unusually high 
levels. It is now regarded as only a moderate threat to human beings. It 
appears far less risky, for example, than asbestos, radon, nickel, coke, 
chromates, or smoking. 
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world and want us to get off. We shall worry about the environment when 
we have become as rich as you." 
Such reactions, perhaps less common today than a few years ago, are 
entirely understandable. It is generally true that the benefits of additional 
production and incomes are greater, the lower the income per head, and 
the harm done by pollution is less, the lower the level of industrialization, 
urbanization, and production. For this reason, it would be absurd to 
impose uniform environmental standards everywhere, irrespective of the 
level of development. But it is often cheaper to design processes that are 
low in destructive material discharges than to try later to modify these 
wastes and damages, once they have been generated. There is no reason 
why developing countries should not learn from the mistakes of the now 
advanced countries and avoid courses of action that they would later 
regret. It has been found that the additional costs attributable to 
environmental and health safeguards in non-environmental projects have 
ranged from 0 to 3 per cent of total project costs. Costs are lower the 
earlier the protective measures are added to the project design. 
Increasingly, these protective measures are being incorporated in the basic 
design of projects, such as emission controls for industrial plants. Pre-
vention is much cheaper and more effective than cure. Sound watershed 
management, for example, which protects reservoirs from siltation and 
floods, costs much less than rehabilitation of a deforested, eroded 
watershed. 
It remains true that the rich countries' consumption of energy is 
profligate. They enjoy spacious houses with high heating and cooling costs, 
and sprawling cities with roads clogged by two or three cars per family. 
The advanced countries produce about half of the 6 billion metric tons of 
greenhouse gases emitted each year, with only one-fifth of the world's 
population. This is, of course, a reflection of the very unequal distribution 
of wealth and income. Energy consumption in the developing countries is 
expected to grow at a rate of 5 per cent a year, from 2,000 million tons of 
oil equivalent (mte) today to over 3,000 by the end of the century. All 
countries will have to raise their energy efficiency and develop new and 
renewable sources of energy. 
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ECONOMIC GROWfH VERSUS ENVIRONMENT? 
The problem of "growth versus the environment" is wrongly posed. 
Growth is simply the intertemporal dimension of any strategy. Production, 
consumption, poverty reduction, income redistribution, employment, 
environmental protection, must each have a time profile, and this may give 
rise to inter-temporal trade-offs. Economic growth is a side-effect, not the 
aim, of a rational economic policy. It could be that sustainable 
development calls for more, not less, growth. It certainly calls for 
differently composed growth. For, although zero growth is not an option 
(it requires resources to maintain capital and therefore only delays 
exhaustion), unless sustainable development is consciously pursued, zero 
or negative growth could well be the result. 
With technology a given, four options should, theoretically, be 
considered. First, we may abstain from producing as much as we otherwise 
would, in order to reduce pollution and raw material exhaustion, which are 
closely linked to the pattern of production. We opt for fewer goods, in 
order to be saddled with fewer bads. Second, we devote resources that 
would have produced goods to produce products that combat pollution: 
more anti-bads. Whether this implies stepping up the rate of growth of 
national product, slowing it down, or changing its composition, depends 
on conventions of national income accounting. Much that is now counted 
as part of net national income should be deducted as intermediate 
production, as anti-bads, required to combat the bads produced in the 
course of generating the gross national product. There is something to be 
said for the foundation of a Society for the Promotion of Anti-Bads. 
Third, we may step up the production of goods, notwithstanding the 
fact that they aggravate pollution, to a degree that compensates for the 
growth of pollution: more goods to make up for the growth of bads. 
Finally, we may produce different products, with different characteristics. 
These are not as attractive as those that would have been produced without 
regard to pollution, but with the compensating merit that they carry with 
them less pollution: goods that are not quite so "good," but that generate 
also fewer "bads." Cars may travel more slowly, but are also less polluting. 
Compared with these four options, zero growth, sometimes advocated, 
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would be not only a blW1t but also ineffective instrument for achieving a 
sustainable environment. 
In practice, it is normally much cheaper and more effective to take 
preventive action before the creation of bads than to compensate for their 
generation or to produce instruments to combat them. Just as it is easier 
to build distributional objectives into the growth process, or protection of 
the poor into the adjustment process ab initio, so it is more effective to 
build environmental objectives from the beginning into the direction and 
composition of growth. 
In addition, there is much evidence that some previously polluting 
agents can be used profitably and harmlessly, so that no trade-off arises. It 
points to the existence of W1explored and W1exploited profit opportW1ities, 
which can be seized as a result of environmental regulation. Effluents, 
previously discharged into rivers, have turned out to have commercial uses. 
When W1explored and W1exploited profit opportW1ities are discovered, 
bads can be transformed into goods. This may require some expenditure 
on technical research. In other cases, cheap substitutes can be used to 
replace damaging substances. Du Pont, the world's largest producer of 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), had discovered some equally cheap substitutes, 
which made the provisions of the Montreal Protocol of 1987 (signed by 
57 coW1tries), for the protection of the ozone layer (which protects us 
from certain types of cancer), acceptable. International Business Machines 
Corporation, America's largest source ofCFC-l13 emissions, had reduced 
its emissions in May 1991 by 95 per cent from the 1987 level. In the Ottawa 
Agreement of 1988 some industrial coW1tries bOW1d themselves to reduce 
the volume of CFC emissions by the end of the century to half the 1986 
level. 
The leading electronics companies have moved more rapidly than 
expected to phase out the use of industrial cleansers that damage the ozone 
layer. CFCs are used, in addition to air conditioners, refrigerators, and 
foam insulation, to clean circuit boards and sensitive electronic 
components. Now cheaper, more effective and less damaging alternatives 
have been discovered, including warm, soapy water (The New York Times, 
May 15,1991). Some companies have developed circuit boards that need 
no cleaning at all. 
361 III STREETEN [a] 
Solvents used in the manufacture of pressure-sensitive tape were 
replaced with solventless raw materials, reducing 1,100 tonnes of solvent 
emissions and saving US$1.5 million on one factory alone. On another 
tape-making line, an inert condensation type solvent recovery system 
recycles about 1 million kg of solvent previously emitted in the atmosphere 
at an annual saving of US$750,000 in solvent, production, and energy 
costs. Modification of a plant boiler to burn high-hydrocarbon exhaust 
from a maker saved a million dollars in add-on pollution control and is 
likely to recover US$270,000 of energy annually. Ammonium sulphite 
produced in reactors during the formulation of iron oxide, previously 
discharged through a waste water treatment plant into a river, is now 
concentrated in a vapour compression evaporator and sold as liquid 
fertilizer worth about US$271,000 a year; savings in pollution control 
equipment totaled US$l million. Examples could be multiplied 
(Samstag, 1984). 
Environmentalists claim that these discoveries have important impli-
cations for other environmental concerns, including the reduction of the 
use of fossil fuels, which contributes to global warming, the elimination of 
CFCs from aerosol cans, and the formulation of cleaner gasolines. 
Michael Porter (1990) has argued that environmental regulations are 
entirely consistent with maintaining international competitiveness: 
countries with the most rigorous requirements often lead in exports of the 
affected products. The reason for this paradoxical conclusion is that 
regulations force companies to redesign their technology, to innovate, and 
to find new uses for waste products. The result in the medium to long 
term is often lower costs and improved product quality. Processes are 
adopted that lower the use of scarce or toxic resources and that recycle 
profitably previously wasted by-products. 
Three types of questions have to be investigated: first, the relationship 
between differently composed rates of population growth and of income 
per head and the discharge of harmful substances; second, the relation 
between these substances and the physical environment; and third, the 
impact of these changes in the physical environment on the health and 
well-being of human beings, both now and in the future. The first is 
technical, the second physical, the third biological and physiological 
(Dorfman, 1991). 
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Having answered these three sets of factual questions, the problem 
becomes one of evaluating any remaining conflicts between higher 
incomes and environmental degradation and sharing fairly any sacrifices, 
either of the environment or of income, between the partners. Such fair 
sharing will involve compensation of poorer countries by richer ones for 
accepting measures of environmental protection that are either more costly 
or reduce the rate of growth. This can be done, for example, by issuing 
permits for emissions in excess of their needs to low-income countries, 
which they could sell to the high-income countries, who will want to use 
more permits than they have been initially allocated. A system of 
monitoring both the state of the environment, and individual countries' 
performance and discharges, will be needed, as well as mechanisms for 
penalizing offenders. UNEP now has a Global Environmental Monitoring 
System (GEMS), although it is grossly underfinanced. 
There is now firm evidence available to answer the first question, that 
concerning the relation between income and certain types of pollution. 
The main conclusion is that urban sulphur dioxide concentrations and 
urban suspended particulate matter levels are lower per cubic metre in 
high-income cities than in low-income cities. It is also evident that these 
concentrations have been falling in high-income and middle-income cities 
over the last decade. 
HUMAN, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: POLICY ISSUES 
There is some overlap with, but there are also important differences 
between, the environmental problems of poor and rich countries. Poverty 
has been one of the most important enemies of sustainable environment, 
and environmental degradation has reinforced poverty. As has already been 
said, the poor are both the cause and the principal victims of environmental 
degradation. To be freed from this vicious circle not only sustains the 
environment, but is above all beneficial for the human beings who live in 
it. The fundamental concern of the development effort is not with 
enlarging the choices of trees, but of humans. Deforestation and soil 
erosion as a result of the growing need for fuel wood; the spread of 
schistosomiasis or bilharzia from stagnant water reservoirs; the spread of 
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onchocerciasis or river blindness from running mountain streams; these are 
the environmental problems of poor rural people, caused by them and 
imposing suffering on them. The eradication of poverty will also remove 
these environmental threats, and their removal will contribute to the 
reduction of poverty. 
The first lesson is that late industrial starters can learn from the 
mistakes of earlier starters. It is possible to avoid in the beginning the 
creation of the environmental damage that the advanced industrial 
countries have inflicted upon themselves, and the wasteful uses of energy 
that the Western style of industrialization has involved. Heavy dependence 
on oil supplies and being hooked on the motor car, can be avoided by 
more energy conservation and greater use of indigenous sources of energy. 
These would also contribute to greater self-reliance. 
A second set of policy questions relates to the international location 
of dirty processes. Just as differences in factor endowments guide the 
allocation of resources according to comparative advantage, so differences 
in pollution costs should in principle guide international specialization of 
industry. The costs of pollution will tend to be lower in many developing 
countries, or at least in some areas (cities such as Cairo and Lagos are more 
polluted than London or Washington), and the benefits to be derived from 
industrial production will tend to be higher, because incomes are lower. 
This argument assumes that the benefits from higher incomes accrue to the 
poor. For both these reasons, a shift of some polluting activities from the 
industrial countries to the developing countries (and perhaps some trade 
in toxic waste) can be envisaged. The rule might be summed up by saying, 
"what some find grubby, others find groovy." But this has to be qualified 
in two respects. First, it is important to protect the poor in the developing 
countries, who are liable to be the chief victims of uncontrolled pollution. 
Second, as pointed out by John Williamson, the technical capacity of some 
developing countries may be much less capable of dealing with 
environmental damage. 
A distinction should be drawn between local, regional, and global 
pollution. Global pollution includes the spread of persistent pesticide 
residues that can be carried far beyond national frontiers; the burning of 
fossil fuels, and the release of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxides, and 
CFCs into the atmosphere that may lead to the greenhouse effect and 
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global warming, although some say it will usher in a new ice age; 
deforestation, especially in the tropical rain forests, which may upset the 
ecological balance and deplete genetic resources; the pollution of the 
oceans through oil spillage or dumping from ships; the pollution of air 
streams by jets; the destruction of the ozone layer through chlorofluoro-
carbons, which causes skin cancer, cataract, and other health problems; 
ultraviolet radiation that may lower the harvest of soybeans, the world's 
leading protein crop; chemical wastes that seep downwards to poison 
ground water and upwards to destroy the atmosphere's delicate balance; 
acid rain that ruins forests; and so on. 
Regional pollution arises from the geophysical linkages between 
several countries, such as river pollution, desertification, and regional air 
pollution. Deforestation in the Himalayas causes flooding in Bangladesh. 
DDT is banned in the USA, yet it is found in the mud of Lake Siskiwit 
near Lake Superior, carried by the wind. Acid rain, sulphur dioxide emitted 
from US coal-fired power plants, is carried to Canadian forests. 
Local pollution is confined within national boundaries, such as the 
eutrophication of a lake from fertilizer or sewage discharge. It would be 
legitimate for a country to restrict activities and products that would affect 
it and that result from another country's activities, but such restrictions 
must not be used as a pretext for protectionism by the industrial countries, 
where the pollution is purely local and remains confined to the area of 
production in the developing country. Taxes imposed by industrial 
countries on their pollution-intensive activities can be used by them as an 
excuse to exclude imports from countries that can conduct these activities 
at lower social costs without harm to the importing country. The "sweated 
environment" argument for protection is as fallacious as the "sweated 
labour" argument. The international free trade unions are misguided (or 
act ill the interest of rich country trade unions) insisting on the same 
environmental standards for all countries, so as not to give an "unfair" 
advantage to poor countries. Local environmental problems are also 
presented by traffic congestion in cities, pollution of beaches and along 
coast lines, and suburban sprawl. 
A third set of policy questions relates to the return to the use of some 
natural produc~ that had been hit by the invention of synthetics, but in the 
production of which the costs of pollution had not been allowed for. 
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Pyrethrum against DDT is one example; natural fibres against synthetic 
fibres, another. Some of these natural products have the advantage not 
only of being free from pollution, but also of being efficiently 
labour-intensive (often female labour-intensive) and contributing to rural 
development, and therefore to employment and reduced rural-urban 
migration. 
A fourth set of questions concerns the actions developing countries 
should take in the face of growing scarcity of non-renewable natural 
resources. Many of these have not been priced according to their scarcity, 
taking into account a proper social discount rate and risk premium. A 
correct pricing policy would provide incentives for more economical use 
of these products, for switching to products that use less of these materials 
or none, for a search for new sources of these materials, and for the 
development of substitutes. Meanwhile, the higher revenue earned by the 
material-exporting developing countries should be used for diversification 
and development, while developing countries dependent on their imports 
but without corresponding high-priced exports should be insured against 
damage from higher prices. 
Economists have a bias in favour of using prices to reduce pollution 
and raw material exhaustion. Non-economists object to using taxes to 
discourage damaging activities and to granting "licences to pollute" and 
licences to despoil. The differences rest upon attaching different moral 
evaluations to different things. People value the opportunity to express 
disapproval, which would not be reflected in a fine balance of benefits and 
costs. Licences are normally not given for activities that should be stamped 
as illegitimate. (But licences are given to carry guns in the USA.) Putting 
a price tag on a highly valued item demeans it. The opponents of price 
policies may also think that the motive makes a difference, whereas taxes 
are indifferent to motives. 6 
61n his review of Steven Kelman's book Whatprice incentives? Economists and 
the Environment, in Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. XX (Sept.1982), pp. 
1105-1106, W. J. Baumol replies to the possible view of economists that 
these ways of thinking are irrational: "But, as Kelman asks, is it irrational to 
distinguish between manslaughter and murder? After all, the victim is 
equally dead in both cases! He cites Justice Holmes' telling aphorism 'even 
a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked'." 
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But it is not enough to estimate the possibility of exhaustion and to 
attach a price to these materials, allowing for time and uncertainty; what 
is also needed is coordinated action between the developing countries in 
which these non-renewable materials are to be found. Incentives, both 
rewards and penalties, are required to secure joint action, and agreement 
on rules about how increases in revenue derived from joint scarcity pricing 
should be shared and used for development. In particular, ways should be 
found to mitigate or prevent harm being done to developing countries that 
depend on the imports of these materials. 
A fifth set of questions concerns the role of transnational companies 
in environmental policy. In the new international division oflabour, which 
would he guided by differential pollution costs in different countries, the 
location of certain "dirty" processes in developing countries could be one 
of the functions of the transnational corporation. This could be done either 
by the firm locating certain "dirty" processes within its vertically integrated 
system of operations in a developing country where the social costs of 
pollution are lower and the benefits from industrialization higher, or by 
transferring the whole integrated operation to such a country. The 
argument would be analogous to that oflocating unskilled or semi-skilled 
labour-intensive processes and products in developing countries. One 
important advantage is that the transnational corporation will act as a 
pressure group to ensure access for the products to the markets of the 
developed countries, which might otherwise put up protectionist barriers 
under the pretext of environmental protection. 
GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
The problems of the local environment are different from those of the 
global. Common property rights to a local pond or grazing area are often 
respected, and behaviour has evolved that prevents their destruction. Not 
so for the global commons. Our present interdependent, pluralistic, multi-
polar world is less stable, and more in need of the promotion of peace, 
prosperity, conservation, and global leadership than past orders, in which 
a single dominant power has assumed these responsibilities. No single 
power is both able and willing to assume these functions today. Although 
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this can be a danger, it also presents us for the first time in history with the 
opportunity to create a world order based not on dominance and 
dependence, but on equality, pluralism, and cooperation. This calls for the 
exercise of our creative institutional imagination and for sacrifices of 
national sovereignty. 
We are suffering from a lag of institutions behind technology. The 
revolutions in the technologies of transport, travel, communications, and 
information have unified and shrunk the globe, but the organization of the 
world into nation states dates back to the Peace of West ph alia in 1648, to 
the 19th century unifications of Germany and Italy, and the post-First 
World War creation of new nation states. When the nation states were 
founded, the city states and the feudalism that preceded them had become 
too small for the scale of operations required by the Industrial Revolution. 
The political institution therefore was adapted to the new industrial 
technology, to the roads, railways, and canals. The nation state was then 
a progressive institution. But technological determinism is not plausible. 
The adaptation of institutions to technology is not an inevitable process. 
The Middle Ages had, for example, lost the Roman technology about 
roads, baths, aqueducts, and amphitheatres, and these were allowed to fall 
into disrepair. But now the nation state, with its insistence on full sover-
eignty, has become an obstacle to further progress. It has landed us in 
several "Prisoners' Dilemmas": each nation acts in its rational self-interest, 
and the result is that every country is worse off. It pays each nation to 
pursue this mutually destructive course, whether others do likewise or not. 
I shall not discuss the desirability or the feasibility of a world govern-
ment. If it ever were to come about, it would probably be the result of a 
trend we are already beginning to observe. Common interests and conflicts 
are running nowadays across national boundaries. The European farmers 
are in conflict with the European industrialists and the public that has to 
pay for the Common Agricultural Policy. The advanced countries' textile 
manufacturers are aligned in the Multifibre Arrangement against Third 
World textile exporters and the consumers in industrial countries. US 
industrial interests are aligned with Third World debtors in wishing 
interest rates to be low, against its financial interests, who prefer high 
interest rates. Industrial countries' bankers are aligned with developing 
countries' exporters, against the protectionist lobbies of those who fear 
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imports. The nation state may become the inappropriate level at which 
such issues can be resolved. 
Clearly, Prisoners' Dilemma outcomes move the world economy away 
from a more to a less efficient allocation of resources. There exist, 
therefore, potential gains, by moving back to more efficient allocations. 
According to Coase's Theorem) in the absence of transaction costs and in 
the presence of well specified property rights, a legal framework, and full 
information, if one country inflicts damages on another which are greater 
than the benefits to the first country, the injured country will enter into a 
contract with the injuring country and compensate it for not inflicting the 
injury, and still be better off. Or, if the benefits are greater than the 
damage, the injuring country can compensate the injured country for 
accepting the damage, and still be better off than it would have been, had 
it been prevented from inflicting the damage. For example, the US emits 
acid rain to Canada. Canada could then offer compensation to the US for 
relinquishing the emission of sulphur dioxide, the chief component in acid 
rain, and still be better off than it would be in accepting the acid rain; or 
the US could offer compensation to Canada for accepting the acid rain and 
still be better off than it would be if it had to clean up the mess and stop 
the emission. But as we all know to our regret, we are far away from 
outcomes according to Coase's Theorem, although we are not always at 
the other end of the spectrum, the Prisoners' Dilemma. Coase's Theorem 
remains useful, in spite of its unrealistic assumptions, in drawing our 
attention to the fact that there are unexploited mutual profit opportunities 
from restraint. Obviously compensation ought not always, or even often, 
to be paid. The losers, such as the English landlords after the repeal of the 
Corn Laws in 1846, may not deserve to be compensated; or, even if they 
do deserve it, the costs of imposing taxes to finance the compensation may 
be so large as to make the compensation uneconomic. But the fact that it 
could be paid draws our attention to potential unexploited gains. 
Add to the Prisoners' Dilemma the Free Rider Effect, according to 
which each country relies on others to bear the costs of arrangements that 
benefit everybody. As a result, public goods, such as peace, an open trading 
system (including freedom of the seas), well-defmed property rights, standards 
of weights and measures, international stability, a working monetary system, 
or conservation of the global environment, are undersupplied, while public 
369 III STREETEN la! 
bads, such as wars, pollution, raw material exhaustion, and poverty, are 
oversupplied. The situation has been described in parables and similes such 
as the Tragedy of the Commons, Social Traps, the Isolation Paradox, ete. 
Everybody free rides, and thereby ensures that there is no horse. These 
parables contradict the parable of the Invisible Hand, according to which 
the pursuit of self-interest by each individual promotes the good of all. 
The ranking of preferences by each country is the following: 
1) My country does not contribute while others do. (Free rider, 
defection of one.) 
2) My country contributes together with others. (Cooperation.) 
3) No country contributes. (Prisoners' Dilemma outcome.) 
4) My country contributes while no other country does. (Sucker.) 
Behaviour by each according to 1, or the fear of 4, leads to outcome 3. 
Although 2 is preferred to 3, we end up with 3, unless either rewards and 
penalties, or autonomous cooperative motivations, lead to 2. Incentives 
and expectations must be such as to rule out outcomes 4 and 1, so that if 
I (or you) contribute, I will not end up a sucker. In the absence of such 
motivations, the result is that peace, monetary stability, an open world 
economy, environmental protection, debt relief, raw material conservation, 
poverty reduction, and world development will be undersupplied. 
It has been shown that iterative games of the Prisoners' Dilemma type 
lead to non-destructive outcomes. The partners learn and adopt mutually 
beneficial strategies. It has already been shown that we find ourselves 
between the two extremes of Prisoners' Dilemmas and Coase's outcomes. 
For several reasons it is harder to reach cooperative agreements in 
international transactions than in others. There are now many states, and 
large numbers make agreements more difficult. We do not have a world 
government that could enforce agreements. Change is rapid, which 
undermines the basis of stability on which agreements are based. The 
absence of a hegemonic power also removes the sanctions against breaking 
the agreement. And all these factors prevent the trust from being built up, 
which is an essential prerequisite for international agreements. 
Examples of Prisoners' Dilemmas on the global scale are ubiquitous. 
Above all there is the arms race, which, though we have so far avoided a 
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major nuclear war, has contributed to hundreds of minor wars, mostly in 
the Third World, but also in the heartland of Europe. Then there is 
competitive protectionism, through which each country casts its 
employment problem onto others. Competitive exchange rate movements; 
research and development wars; investment wars; environmental pol-
lution; the killing of whales; and the debt crisis are only some of the areas 
in which these battles are fought. 
To avoid these traps, coordination and enforcement of policies are 
needed. But coordination means that each country has to do things it does 
not want to do. The US has to balance its budget in order to lower world 
interest rates; Germany has to grow faster, but she does not want to suck 
in guest workers from Turkey and Yugoslavia; many say Japan should 
import more, but she does not want to hurt her domestic industries. And 
so on. 
Even Mrs. Thatcher, a powerful advocate of free markets and state 
minimalism, in a speech to the United Nations in N ew York on November 
8,1989, had come to recognize that in order to avoid global warming and 
coastal flooding, countries that emit carbon dioxide and other gases that 
trap heat in the atmosphere would have to act together, that restrictions 
would have to be obligatory, and their application would have to be 
carefully monitored. Anyone country acting by itself would be at a 
competitive disadvantage by having to incur the higher costs of protecting 
the environment (New York Times, Nov. 9, 1989). 
A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
Just as in an uncoordinated world each country has an incentive to pour its 
problem of unemployment, metaphorically, into the yards of others, so 
does it, literally, cast its muck into the neighbouring fields or into the 
oceans, the lakes, the atmosphere, the land, or the food chains which are 
the global commons. Acid rain that kills forests, the emission of chloro-
fluorocarbons that destroy the ozone layer, the global warming resulting 
from the burning of fossil fuels, overfishing in common waters, are 
examples of global abuse that can be stopped only by global agreements 
that limit national sovereignty. 
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The domestic environmental problems of rich countries are often in 
conflict with poverty reduction in developing countries, while the domestic 
environmental problems of poor countries both arise from, and contribute 
to, poverty. But the global environmental problems are shared by the 
whole of humanity and call for global solutions. 
The solution to mutually destructive actions pursued by each country 
separately is the establishment of a global environmental protection 
agency, with powers of enforcement. Each country, by sacrificing some of 
its national sovereignty, gains more in the pursuit of its national interests 
than it would have done, had it continued to act independently. 
Such an agency would require substantial finance and powers. A tiny 
step in this direction was taken in November 1990. Twenty-five industrial 
and developing countries agreed to establish a Global Environmental 
Facility (GEF), which is run jointly by the World Bank, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP). It started off on a trial basis in 1991 
with a fund of about US$1.3 billion. A little progress was made at the Rio 
United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development in June 
1992, which gave strong verbal support to the Facility. In March 1994, 
developed countries announced a pledge ofUS$2 billion financial aid until 
1997 to replenish a new and restructured version ofGEF. Compare this 
sum to the US$ 70 billion that the UN said was needed for environmental 
purposes, and with the US$ 125 billion each year between 1993 and 2000 
recommended in Agenda 21. 
Initially, modest resources will be devoted to providing help in 
financing programmes and projects that affect the global environment. 
Four areas have been selected for the operations of the Facility. 
1) Protecting the ozone layer. The GEF's work will be coordinated 
with the implementation of the Montreal Protocol to phase out 
the use of CFCs, halons, and other harmful gases. 
2) Limitinggreenhouse gas emissions. The emission of carbon dioxide, 
CFCs, and methane will be limited, the adoption of cleaner 
technologies and fuels will be encouraged, as well as reforest-
ation and forestry conservation. 
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3) Protecting biodiversity. The diversity of species contributes to 
materials for medicines and industrial products, genetic resources 
for food production, and the regulation of climatic and rainfall 
patterns. 
4) Protecting global water resources. The Facility will support 
programmes that encourage planning against oil spills; to abate 
water pollution, to prevent and clean up toxic waste pollution 
along major rivers and to conserve water bodies. 
Developing countries with GNP per head of less than US$4,OOO will be 
eligible for GEF funding for investment projects and supporting services. 
In 1992, the Ministers of 93 countries reviewed in Copenhagen the 
progress made under the 1986 Montreal Protocol on the ozone layer. They 
took three big decisions: to set up a fund to help poor countries; to tighten 
the timetable to phase out CFCs (by the end of 1995); and to add two 
new substances to the list of restricted chemicals. 
Since then, negotiations have continued. Two treaties were signed in 
Rio by most countries present: one to reduce the emission of greenhouse 
gases, the other to protect biological diversity. Both have been ratified by 
enough countries to come into effect. Vague talk about a climate treaty 
continue. The treaty on biological diversity suffers from disagreement 
among its signatories as to what problems it can help to solve. Meanwhile, 
deserts, wildlife, climate, industry, and governments go on much as before. 
The initial steps towards a Global Environmental Protection Agency 
should be on very specific issues, such as the Montreal Protocol or the 
International Whaling Commission. A sharp and narrow focus in the early 
stages will prevent endless discussion, frustration, and acrimony. But the 
problems of primary concern to the poor people in the developing 
countries - clean air in the towns, access to safe water and sanitation, the 
prevention of soil erosion and deforestation, and population control- are 
not touched by the Facility. From the point of view of these concerns, the 
Rio conference was·a failure. 
Can one conclude as much about Barbados 1994? For small island 
territories, tangible outcomes of this conference include the setting up of 
an. information network (SIDSjNET) and of a technical assistance 
" 
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programme (SIDS{fAP). But such projects are a long way from meeting 
the fundamental, environmental, and development needs of these 
locations, even if they were adequately financed, which they are not. 
Would Barbados '94 turn out to be another sad, one-off exercise in 
conference tourism? Never before has so large and important an inter-
national forum as the Barbados conference been devoted to small island 
affairs. This may be, in itself, an impressive achievement. But the substantive 
measure of success lies elsewhere. The integrated management of fresh 
water and coastal zone ecosystems of small island developing countries, the 
control of those land- or marine-based sources of pollution that degrade 
those waters, and the generation of an indigenous human resource capacity 
to manage both of these ... these have been pronounced as the hopeful, 
tangible spinoffs of Barbados '94. These three key policies are also the 
officially espoused priorities of the GEF's current operational strategy. Yet, 
unless such a strategy is fast deployed by concerted international action, 
environmental degradation for small islands may result in irreversible, 
serious, and extensive damage. The small and beautiful will be the first to 
cross the threshold of environmental non-return. So much for the taste of 
paradise. For some islands, it may already be too late. 
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